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Abstract
We consider the problem of dividing items between individuals in a way that is
fair both in the sense of distributional fairness and in the sense of not having
disparate impact across protected classes. An important existing mechanism for
distributionally fair division is competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI).
Unfortunately, CEEI will not, in general, respect disparate impact constraints. We
consider two types of disparate impact measures: requiring that allocations be
similar across protected classes and requiring that average utility levels be similar
across protected classes. We modify the standard CEEI algorithm in two ways:
equitable equilibrium from equal incomes, which removes disparate impact in
allocations, and competitive equilibrium from equitable incomes which removes
disparate impact in attained utility levels. We show analytically that removing
disparate impact in outcomes breaks several of CEEI’s desirable properties such as
envy, regret, Pareto optimality, and incentive compatibility. By contrast, we can
remove disparate impact in attained utility levels without affecting these properties.
Finally, we experimentally evaluate the tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and
disparate impact in a recommender-system based market.
1 Introduction
Allocating a finite supply of items across individuals with heterogeneous preferences is an extremely
important practical problem (Roth, 2002, 2015). In all applications mechanism designers need to
trade off between various quantities that cannot be satisfied simultaneously and the most typical
debate is how to trade off efficiency (total realized utility), distributional concerns, and various
incentive properties (Nisan and Ronen, 2001; Chen et al., 2013; Caragiannis et al., 2016). A more
recent literature in algorithmic fairness has taken up a different notion of fairness - ensuring ‘equal’
treatment across groups of individuals (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Feldman et al., 2015). In this
paper we explore how to incorporate these group-based notions into a popular division mechanism:
competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI, Varian et al. (1974); Budish (2011)).
CEEI considers a set of items with finite supply and a set of individuals that have preferences over
the items. In CEEI individuals are allocated a budget of pseudo-currency and individual valuations
are used to construct demand functions i.e. what items individuals would ‘buy’ using their budget
given a price for each item. The mechanism computes a market equilibrium - a set of prices for each
item such that the sum of demands meets supply. The allocations from this equilibrium is how the
items are split.
Since CEEI is based on market equilibrium, the division inherits its properties: it is envy-free
(everyone prefers their own allocation to anyone else’s), has no regret (individuals would not change
the allocations, given the budget and prices), it is Pareto efficient (nobody can be made worse off
without making someone else better off), and it is strategy proof (individuals report their valuations
truthfully) when instances are large (Varian et al., 1974; Azevedo and Budish, 2018).
An equally important question to what to maximize is how to actually compute CEEI (Nisan and
Ronen, 2001). When items are divisible we can use convex programming to choose a particular
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equilibrium solution where the allocation maximizes the product of utilities aka. the Nash social
welfare (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959; Cole et al., 2017). In practice NSW maximization produces
highly efficient and yet distributionally fair outcomes and has been hailed as an ‘unreasonably fair’
way of allocating items, even in the indivisible case (Caragiannis et al., 2016).
For these reasons, CEEI and its variants are used in real world allocation problems such as allocating
courses to students in business schools (Budish, 2011) and the splitting of tasks such as chores
between roommates (Spliddit.com, Goldman and Procaccia (2015)).
By contrast to the fair division literature, the algorithmic fairness literature focuses on ‘fairness’ of
treatment across groups (see the Related Work section). We focus on two particular notion of fairness.
The first, motivated by real world constraints: a mechanism should not have disparate impact in
outcomes across protected classes (Barocas and Selbst, 2016). This is particularly relevant when the
‘items’ in question are those protected by law e.g. job interviews.1 We also focus on a different sense
of disparate impact. We allow allocations to differ across groups but we require that realized utility is
equalized across groups (on average).
CEEI may generate allocations which do not respect either definition of disparate impact. Our
contributions are to present two modifications to the CEEI procedure. The first, which we refer to as
Equitable Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (EqEEI) generates allocations without disparate impact
in outcomes. To implement EqEEI we use a technique based on kernel two-sample test using the
maximum mean discrepancy distance (Fortet and Mourier, 1953; Gretton et al., 2012) to ‘pre-process’
a set of valuations. We then use these processed valuations in a modified CEEI. We show this yields
allocations whose distributions do not differ across protected classes.
The second generates allocations without disparate impact in realized utilities. We show this can be
done by changing the budget of the disadvantaged group in a CEEI-like procedure. We refer to as
Competitive Equilibrium from Equitable Incomes (CEEqI).
We study EqEEI and CEEqI analytically. We show that removing disparate impact in allocations
carries costs in terms of good properties of the mechanism - EqEEI has envy, regret, is not Pareto
efficient, and loses incentive compatibility. We show how to bound these losses by invoking recent
results on market abstractions Kroer et al. (2019). By contrast, we show that CEEqI remains a no
regret, (budget adjusted) envy free, Pareto efficient, and incentive compatible mechanism. Thus, we
argue, it may be a useful mechanism for trading off distributional and group-level fairness constraints
in practice. Finally, we evaluate the tradeoffs from both EqEEI and CEEqI in a real dataset.
2 Related Work
CEEI is far from the only mechanism for fair division and finite supply linear utilities are far from
the only valuation function. Another commonly studied problem is the allocation of a divisible single
good (often called a cake) to agents with preferences over subsets of the cake (Brams and Taylor,
1996; Chen et al., 2013). This is more complicated than our setting and future work should investigate
the use of various algorithmic fairness constraints to the problem of fair division in this setting.
Other work in fair division has looked at group level metrics for example by expanding notions such
as envy-free and maximin shares to group equivalents (Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2018; Conitzer et al.,
2019a). The closest such extension to our work is the concept of group-envy-freeness either with
respect to existing groups (Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2018) or a much stronger version which extends
to all groups at once (Conitzer et al., 2019a).
Our choice of disparate impact as our desideratum is a choice motivated by practical considerations
and is not be applicable in all environments. A large literature on algorithmic fairness discusses many
ways that fairness can be defined and which kind of fairness is appropriate for which kind of situation
(Dwork et al., 2012; Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Berk et al., 2018; Kusner et al., 2017). A set of papers
also shows that different notions are incompatible and so real world systems must trade off between
these different definitions (Kleinberg et al., 2016; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017; Friedler et al., 2016).
An interesting extension to our preliminary results would be to incorporate other forms of algorithmic
1Note that we do not claim this is always that this notion of algorithmic fairness is the relevant one - this will
depend on the particular application and circumstances.
2
fairness into allocation mechanisms so that practitioners have multiple, off-the-shelf approaches that
can be used in the appropriate situations.
Our approach of constructing representations that are invariant to the protected class has been used
in applying algorithmic fairness notions to the classification problem, e.g. a classifier for which
individual should get a loan (Calders et al., 2009; Feldman et al., 2015; Zemel et al., 2013; Louizos
et al., 2015). Our approach is also strongly related to recent work which shows that collaborative
filtering (Yao and Huang, 2017) or unsupervised learning such as word embeddings can capture
stereotypes and biases that are present in the datasets and presents techniques for removing such
biases (Bolukbasi et al., 2016). Our main contribution is to take these ideas and apply them to the
problem of allocation, we do not claim to originate debiasing methods in general.
3 Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
We consider a set of n individuals U with generic individual i. There are also a set of m divisible
items J with generic item j. Items have finite supply which here we normalize to 1.
Definition 1. An allocation is an x ∈ Rn×m+ with xij indicating the amount of item j that has been
allocated to individual i. Let X be the set of possible allocations given the supply constraints with
Xi being allocations that only allocate to individual i.
Each individual i has a valuation for each item j written as vij . We assume valuations are linear so the
total utility to person i for an allocation x is given by the standard dot product vi · xi =
∑m
j=1 vijxij .
Valuations are strictly positive and there exists a maximum valuation v¯.
We focus on a particular allocation mechanism: competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI).
The mechanism works as follows: each individual is given a unit budget (though generically this can
be a budget of size Bi) of pseudo-currency. Each item j is given a price pj . Given these prices and a
budget, the set of affordable allocations for individual i is {xi ∈ Xi : p · xi ≤ Bi}.
Definition 2. An individual i’s demand given prices p and budget Bi is
di(p,Bi) = {xi ∈ Xi | vi · xi ≥ vi · x′i ∀x′i ∈ Xi s.t. x′i · p ≤ Bi}.
Note that the demand can be set valued but the achieved utility level of the demand, which we write
as d¯i(p,Bi) is unique.
Given individual demand functions we can define an equilibrium.
Definition 3. A market equilibrium is a feasible allocation x∗ ∈ X and a set of prices p∗ such that
for all i x∗i ∈ di(p,Bi) and for all items j
∑
i xij = 1.
A particular market may have multiple equilibria. However, there is one market equilibrium that is
always guaranteed to exist: the Eisenberg-Gale equilibrium (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959), where each
individual gets the same bang-per-buck across across all items assigned to the individual. We use this
specific equilibrium, and refer to the assignment mechanism which uses this equilibrium as CEEI2. It
is well known that this equilibrium (and many related variants) can be found by solving a convex
program (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959; Cole et al., 2017):
max
x
∑
i
Bilog(vi · xi) subject to ∀j
∑
i
xij ≤ 1
The convex program interpretation means the outcomes of our mechanism will be distributionally
fair in the sense of maximizing the product of utilities. In addition, because our allocation is a market
equilibrium we are guaranteed envy freeness, no regret (relative to the prices), and that each individual
gets at least their maximin share. In addition, the CEEI prices are unique though allocations may
have ties and so may not be.
A nice structural feature of the solution to the CEEI optimization problem is that it is the maximal
point of the set of utility prices for individuals. The utility price of an individual i is the amount of
2We refer to the CEEI across this text, though this is not technically correct: CEEI prices are unique but
there may be multiple allocations x corresponding to the unique prices p when individuals have ties across items.
However, the utility levels attained across these allocations are equal.
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budget they need to spend to acquire 1 point of utility (the inverse of this is often referred as the
bang-per-buck rate of individual i). It is easily seen that in the optimal solution each individual has a
single utility price βi = Bivi·xi =
pj
vij
for all j such that xij > 0. Thus we may think of the algorithmic
problem of finding the CEEI solution as one of finding the optimal utility prices for each individual.3
3.1 Large Market Results
An important part of CEEI is individuals reporting their valuations to the mechanism. A mechanism
that ensures individuals report their valuations truthfully is known as strategy proof. While it is
known that individuals can often misreport their valuations and get better outcomes in CEEI (Brânzei
et al., 2014) it is also known that many non-strategy proof mechanisms can become strategy proof in
the large (SP-L).
We will be mostly interested in large scale allocation problems (e.g. courses to students), thus here
we turn to a stochastic model to study whether CEEI (and our later proposed mechanisms) are indeed
SP-L.4
We will use the following stochastic model for growing our market. There are n randomly drawn
individuals and a constant set of m items. The supply of each item grows linearly in market size and
is given by sj = cjn. There is a distribution of valuations F which has full support on the set of
possible valuations [0, v¯]m.
We consider the definition of SP-L introduced by Azevedo and Budish (2018). Let σ be a mapping
(not necessarily truthful) from valuations to reports. Suppose that σ has full range (i.e. for any report,
there is a type that gives that report with some probability). Consider an individual i who can either
report their true valuations vi or some other valuation v′i with everyone else reporting according to
σ. Consider i’s expected utility with the expectation taken relative to the n − 1 other individuals
behaving according to σ with their true types drawn from F .
Definition 4. A mechanism is SP-L if, given σ and any  > 0 there exists a n¯ such that if n > n¯ then
the gain from reporting any v′i instead of their true valuation vi gains is at most .
As Azevedo and Budish (2018) point out, this notion is stronger than dominant strategy incentive
compatibility but weaker than simply requiring that truth-telling be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We
first show a result about CEEI which we can then use in later proofs.
Theorem 1. For any σ the expected utility gain from misreporting for an individual i in the CEEI
mechanism is bounded by O( 1n ). Thus CEEI is SP-L.
Our proof consists of a series of lemmas about the effect on the market that any individual agent
can have. The lemmas may be of independent theoretical interest but in the interest of space we
relegate them to the appendix. First we show that the amount by which an individual can affect prices
decreases with market size. Second, we show that for the proposed stochastic model market prices
become bounded from below. This allows us to give the convergence rate in the Theorem.
4 Disparate Impact
While CEEI is distributionally fair, it may be unfair in a different way. Suppose each individual is
associated with a binary protected class label zi. The literature on algorithmic fairness focuses on
disparate impact across these protected classes. Disparate impact may occur in one of two ways. First,
mechanism designers may care about overall allocation of items not differing across groups. This is
particularly relevant when mechanisms are used in legally protected domains such as the allocation
of items related to credit, housing, or jobs. Second, designers may care about realized utility levels
being equalized across groups. The CEEI allocations may not respect either definition of fairness.
3This observation regarding the maximality properties of utility prices was previously proven in the quasi-
linear case (where utility is given by xiv˙i − p · xi) by Conitzer et al. (2019b) and in the Appendix we extend
this result to the our case.
4Our results are stronger than existing results (Jackson and Manelli, 1997; Azevedo and Budish, 2018) as we
give a convergence rate for large finite markets rather than considering limit definitions for continuous markets.
In addition, our results extend the general results in Azevedo and Budish (2018) as we allow for a continuous
outcome space.
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4.1 Equitable Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
Given an allocation x let fzx be the probability mass function for the empirical distribution of
allocations for individuals with protected class z ∈ {0, 1}. Our first notion of algorithmic fairness
requires that the allocation distribution conditioned on the protected class is the same across classes.
Definition 5. We say that an allocation has no disparate impact in allocations if f1x = f0x .
It is fairly clear that CEEI may not respect the protected class. Even though CEEI does not use z
directly, v may be related to z and thus lead to allocations that do not respect the protected class.
Unfortunately, the simple solution of adding f1x = f
0
x as a constraint in the convex program above
changes the problem away from a convex program and the solution becomes a MIP. However, it is
well known that (in the case of random variables) if two variables are independent, then functions of
them are also independent.
This suggests the following procedure which we refer to as equitable equilibrium from equal incomes
(EqEEI). Everyone reports their valuations, we construct a matrix V . We transform the matrix into Vˆ
such that f0
Vˆ
= f1
V¯
, where fz
Vˆ
is the empirical distribution of Vˆ under protected class z. Because of
this procedure’s similarity to past work we refer to this as the set of ‘debiased’ valuations.
We then compute CEEI using Vˆ . Note that for f0
Vˆ
= f1
V¯
to hold, it must be that for any individual’s
valuation vector vˆ, it is equally likely to be found in class 0 or 1 - when the number of individuals
is finite, this means that if there is an individual in class 0 with a vector vˆ there must also be one in
class 1 with the same vˆ.
We can pool all items assigned to individuals with vector vˆ and split each item uniformly among
them.5 Because these individuals all have vector vˆ they are indifferent among the pooled set of items
(under Vˆ ), and any reassignment is also guaranteed to be a CEEI under Vˆ .
Because allocations are now deterministic functions of vˆ vectors and because vˆ does not distinguish
classes we can formally state that:
Theorem 2. An EqEEI (p, x) has no disparate impact in allocations.
Of course, one choice of Vˆ is setting vˆij to a constant and giving everyone an equal fractional share.
However, this will give a very poor allocation. Instead we would like to choose Vˆ such that we
somehow maintain ‘good’ allocation properties. To this end, our choice of Vˆ can be guided by known
results:
Known Result 1 (Kroer et al. (2019)). If we compute the CEEI allocation x for valuation matrix Vˆ
and use x with the real valuation matrix V then quantities such as envy, regret, and maximin share,
can be bounded by a linear function of ‖V − Vˆ ‖1,∞. Finally the Nash social welfare can be bounded
by a multiplicative function of ‖V − Vˆ ‖1,∞.
The 1,∞ norm is difficult to minimize, so Kroer et al. (2019) suggest using the Frobenius norm
instead. Thus, to apply EqEEI in practice, we propose to solve minVˆ ||V − Vˆ ||F subject to f0Vˆ = f1Vˆ .
Then given this solution, we will compute the CEEI allocation using Vˆ . EqEEI will then be a CEEI
with respect to Vˆ .
Next we show a counterexample showing that EqEEI is unfortunately not strategyproof, even in
the large. In other words, when EqEEI is deployed, individuals can gain non-negligible utility
from misreporting their valuation vector. The reason is that when the valuation distributions f0V , f
1
V
conditioned on z are very different from each other, then some individuals must be mapped to a
debiased valuation that is quite far from their original, causing them to buy suboptimal bundles.
Example 1. We will consider a counterexample consisting of a market with a continuum of individuals.
Let there be two items: item A has valuation 1 for every individual. Item B is where heterogeneity
occurs and individuals have a valuation in v ∈ [0, 2] for this item.
5This is equivalent to creating a representative buyer in the abstraction framework of Kroer et al. (2019).
Creating a representative buyer may be preferable for computational purposes.
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The continuous set of individuals is parametrized by pdfs f1, f0 : [0, 2]→ R+ for z = 0 and z = 1
respectively, with f i(z) being the density of individuals of class i with valuation z for item A. In the
continuous case the supply constraint is that
∫
i
xij = 1 for j = A,B.
Let the median values of f0 and f1 be B¯0 and B¯1, with B¯0 < 1 < B¯1. In a standard CEEI more
individuals from class 1 will receive item B and more individuals from class 0 will receive item A.
Thus, CEEI will not respect disparate impact with respect to allocations. In this case ‘debiasing’
maps each individual in each class to a new valuation vˆ(z, v) such that the resulting distribution
from both classes is fˆ . Let us consider the case where the fˆ continues to have full support, this is not
required but makes the logic clearer.
CEEI with respect to this new fˆ generates an allocation map xˆ(vˆ). Notice that these allocations can
only include a measure 0 set of types that receive both items. This is because CEEI sets equal rates
and if prices are such that some ¯ˆv receives equal rates then any vˆ > ¯ˆv must prefer a pure allocation
of item B at these prices while any vˆ < ¯ˆv would prefer a pure allocation of item A.
However, since f1 and f0 are mapped to the same fˆ , one of the following must be true: there is a v
in class 1 with vˆ(v) < ¯ˆv but v > ¯ˆv or there is a v in class 0 with vˆ(v) > ¯ˆv but v < ¯ˆv. Thus, these
individuals will be receiving the ‘wrong item’ with respect to their true valuations. Thus, they would
like to misreport and pretend to be a different type v′ in their class which is receiving the correct item.
Such a v′ must exist since allocations are not distinguishable across classes and so individuals in
both protected classes must be receiving some allocation of purely a single item.
While EqEEI is not strategyproof in the large, it does give a very strong guarantee: allocations are
indistinguishable based on z. Thus it may be a desirable solution concept when such guarantees are
required, e.g. by law. Next we will investigate a solution concept that is allowed to distinguish on z,
but where we get stronger guarantees in terms of properties satisfied by standard CEEI.
4.2 Competitive Equilibrium from Equitable Incomes
We now consider equitable allocations in utility space. Given an allocation x let U(x)z be the average
utility of individuals with protected class z in allocation x.
Definition 6. We say that an allocation x has no disparate impact in utilities if U(x)1 = U(x)0.
It is clear that vanilla CEEI may not satisfy the condition above. For simplicity, we assume that group
0 is the group which under xCEEI has U(x)1 < U(x)0.
We propose the following mechanism: instead of everyone being allocated an equal budget of size 1,
everyone with protected class z = 0 is allocated a budget of 1 and everyone with z = 1 is allocated a
budget of B1 > 1 such that average utilities equalize. Such a B1 is guaranteed to exist:
Theorem 3. There exists B¯ such that the EG equilibrium allocation x∗¯
B
has U(x∗)1 = U(x∗)0.
The proof of the theorem follows from the following. First, for B1 = 0, we have U(x∗0)1 < U(x
∗
0)0.
Second, for large enoughB1, we haveU(x∗0)1 > U(x
∗
0)0. Third, the EG allocations x
∗ are continuous
in B. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists B¯ such that U(x∗)1 = U(x∗)0.
We refer to the mechanism which uses the EG allocation from this B¯ as competitive equilibrium from
equitable incomes. Importantly, this allocation can be computed efficiently.
Corollary 1. For any  > 0 we can compute B¯ such that the EG equilibrium computed using B¯
has |U(x∗0)1 − U(x∗0)0| <  using log( 1 ) number of CEEI solves.
Since the difference U(x∗)1−U(x∗)0 is monotone we can even use a simply binary search procedure
to find B¯. Once we have this B¯ we can use the EG equilibrium allocation as the item assignments. We
refer to this procedure as competitive equilibrium from equitable incomes (CEEqI). In what follows
we assume WLOG that B1 ≥ 1.
Unlike EqEEI, CEEqI will preserve many properties of CEEI quite well. Indeed, we can show that:
Theorem 4. CEEqI has no regret (individuals prefer their CEEqI allocations to any allocation they
could afford given their CEEqI budgets), no scaled envy (every individual in the group with larger
budget has no envy, whereas individuals in the group with lower budgets has no envy after scaling
their utility by B1), CEEqI allocations are Pareto optimal, CEEqI is SP-L.
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The first three properties follow directly from CEEI being a market equilibrium. For SP-L we relegate
the proof to the appendix; intuitively it is an application of Theorem 1 (which tells us that individuals
have negligible impact on prices as markets get large) with the additional note that as the market gets
large the effect of any individual on the chosen value of B1 goes to zero - thus both B1 and prices
become exogenous to any individual i and reporting true valuations becomes utility maximizing.
5 Experiment
Thus, we now have everything required to perform a real experiment. We take a classic recom-
mendation systems dataset, MovieLens, which has 1 million ratings of ∼ 4000 movies by ∼ 6000
users.
The rating data does not include all ratings for all movies. We use a standard technique from
recommender systems to construct a low rank approximation to the full valuation matrix (see
Appendix).
MovieLens contains metadata about the users rating movies. In particular we can look at user reported
gender (dichotomized into male and female). We train a simple 2 layer neural network to predict
gender from the learned U vectors and find we can achieve an out-of-sample AUC of approximately
∼ .76. Thus, if we were to construct an allocation system based on these vectors, even though such a
system does not explicitly use gender as an input, its outputs may be quite different on gender lines.
To further underscore this point, remember that the vector representations trained above embed users
and movies into the same vector space. Thus, if we have a function gˆ(ui) which inputs a user vector
and outputs a guess about the user’s gender we can take a trained movie vector mj and pass it through
gˆ to get an estimate of the ‘genderedness’ of the movie.
In figure 1 we show the ‘most male’ and ‘most female’ movies according to this procedure. We see
that indeed strong gender stereotypes are encoded into the movie vectors.
Male Stereotyped Movies Female Stereotyped Movies
Half Baked (1998), Dumb and Dumber (1994), South Park: Big-
ger, Longer and Uncut (1999), Beavis and Butt-head Do Amer-
ica (1996), Happy Gilmore (1996), Evil Dead II (Dead By Dawn)
(1987), Texas Chainsaw Massacre, The (1974), Aliens (1986),
From Dusk Till Dawn (1996), Me, Myself and Irene (2000), Hal-
loween (1978), Rocky IV (1985), Kingpin (1996), Waterboy, The
(1998), Billy Madison (1995), Plan 9 from Outer Space (1958),
Godzilla 2000 (1999), Dirty Work (1998), Conan the Barbarian
(1982), Night of the Creeps (1986)
Walk in the Clouds, A (1995), Mulan (1998), Parent Trap, The
(1998), Ever After: A Cinderella Story (1998), Anastasia (1997),
Out of Africa (1985), Color Purple, The (1985), Ghost (1990),
Tarzan (1999), Mary Poppins (1964), Sense and Sensibility (1995),
Titanic (1997), Little Mermaid, The (1989), Beauty and the Beast
(1991), Pretty Woman (1990), Newsies (1992), Grease (1978),
Dirty Dancing (1987), Sound of Music, The (1965), Condorman
(1981)
Figure 1: Embedding systems trained on past ratings produce vectors that contain gender stereotypes.
Perhaps in the case of allocating scarce movie theater seats these biases would not be a big deal (or
maybe they would). However, if we were to think of a similar system being used for e.g. allocations
of job ads, then things start to look different. Problems can also arise if the system is allocating goods
to individuals where an adversary may want to use knowledge of an individual’s allocation to try to
reverse engineer a hidden protected class membership (e.g. membership in a vulnerable group).
From the trained model we construct the complete matrix of valuations. We choose a submatrix
of the top 1000 most rated movies and top 1000 users with the most ratings to construct V for our
market. We compute the various equilibria for our mechanisms using the EG convex program where
the movies are items, by default have budget 1, and all movies have supply 1.
5.1 EqEEI Allocations
In order to construct the EqEEI allocation we need to construct the ‘debiased’ matrix Vˆ . To do so
we parametrize Vˆ = f(V ) via a neural network. To evaluate the constraint ¯ˆv1 = ¯ˆv0 we can express
this via any distance between distributions. We choose the maximum mean discrepancy distance
(MMD, Fortet and Mourier (1953)). The MMD is used in the literature on testing whether two
probability distributions are equal from samples (Gretton et al., 2009, 2012; Lopez-Paz and Oquab,
2016). Gretton et al. (2012) shows that in the case of two random probability distributions X and
Y we can test if they are equal by taking a well behaved kernel k (we use the Gaussian kernel) and
computing
MMD(X,Y ) = E [k(X,X)]− 2E [k(X,Y )] + E [k(Y, Y )] .
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The MMD here will be 0 iff X = Y . In finite samples, we simply take sample means from the
distributions instead of the expectation.
The literature on two-sample testing focuses on asking whether two distributions are equal (and so
derives test statistics for finite sample applications of the MMD). We will instead use the MMD to
make them so using a continuous relaxation of the constrained optimization:
max
f
||V − f(V )||2 + λMMD(¯ˆv1, ¯ˆv0).
This formulation is non-convex (as f will be a neural network) but in practice we find that it can be
solved satisfactorily via stochastic gradient descent.
We apply MMD-based pre-processing to the user level vectors U . By setting λ high enough (in our
case, 2e6) we can reduce the ability of a classifier to detect gender from the vectors. We find that
when U is transformed the AUC of a trained classifier on f(V ) is 0.5, i.e. at chance levels.
We now look at various losses in allocation quality from using EqEEI instead of CEEI. Let x∗ be
the CEEI allocation for the original matrix V and let (xˆ∗, pˆ∗) be the EqEEI allocation (i.e. the one
generated from CEEI on Vˆ ). We consider how enforcing a lack of disparate outcomes affects the
following metrics, which are normalized such that each metric shows the fraction of the optimal value
missing or obtained, depending on metric.
Regreti(xˆi, pˆ) =
vi · xˆi − d¯i(pˆ, bi)
d¯i(pˆ, bi)
Envyi(x) =
maxi′ vi · (xi − x′i)
maxi′ vi · x′i
Pareto Gap(xˆ) =
∑
i vi · xˆi∑
i vi · xP (xˆ)
Geometric Mean Gap =
exp(
∑
i log(vi · xˆi))
exp(
∑
i log(vi · x∗))
Efficiency Gap(x∗i , xˆi) =
∑
i xˆi · vi∑
i x
∗
i · vi
We have two metrics that are for each individual i. Regreti(xˆi, pˆ) is how close i is to achieving the
utility of their demand. Envyi(x) is how much i would prefer the allocation of some other individual.
Recall that in true CEEI regret and envy is 0.
We have three ‘market level’ metrics. A market equilibrium is guaranteed to be Pareto efficient -
nobody can be made better off without making someone else worse off. This may not be preserved
in EqEEI however. Pareto Gap(xˆ) is the social welfare achieved at the solution xˆ divided by the
social welfare at the best Pareto-improving allocation xP (xˆ). Geometric Mean Gap is the geometric
mean of utilities achieved in the solution xˆ divided by the geometric mean of utilities in the optimal
solution x∗ to the original problem. Finally, Efficiency Gap(x∗i , xˆi) is what fraction of the social
welfare from the original CEEI solution is obtained in EqEEI or CEEqI.
In our MovieLens constructed market we see that each metric has a modest 5-10% loss from using
EqEEI over CEEI:
Metric Regret Envy Pareto Gap Geometric Mean Gap Efficiency Gap
EqEEI loss -0.1 -0.08 0.95 0.94 0.94
5.2 CEEqI Allocations
We now study CEEqI allocations. When we compute CEEI for the 1000 by 1000 market described
above, we find only a minor imbalance between class utilities (on the order of 5%). To really study
the tradeoffs between class-level distributional fairness and other objectives, we construct an instance
with larger class imbalance. To do so, we construct a new valuation matrix by multiplying the vi
vectors of all individuals in class 1 by .75.
This yields CEEI outcomes with substantial disparate impact in utilities (on the order of ∼ 25%). We
now consider using CEEqI to remedy this issue. Recall that CEEqI only changes budgets - therefore
it generates Pareto optimal, no regret, no (scaled) envy allocations. For evaluation, we only consider
the geometric mean gap and the inequity as a function of budget for the protected group (the other
group receiving always a budget of 1).
Figure 2 shows that changing budgets equalizes average utilities while only changing the geometric
mean utility attained by the equilibrium a little bit. Intuitively this happens for several reasons. First,
the class 1 only forms about ∼ 30% of the market. Second, the item transfer is efficient in the sense
that we know from examples above that there are items that are strongly preferred by one class. This
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means that we can increase the average utility of class 1 by moving those items from class 0 at a
relatively small cost (since class 0 individuals do not actually value those items very highly).
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Figure 2: CEEqI results. Even
after modifying the valuation ma-
trix to increase group level dis-
parate outcomes in utility we see
that CEEqI can reduce this differ-
ence at only a small cost to the over-
all objective of the geometric mean.
6 Conclusion
The notion of fairness of treatment has become an important research area in machine learning.
Mechanism design is a practical field. We do not claim to have solved all problems of ‘unbiased’
mechanisms in this paper. Rather, we offer mechanism designers a particular tool that can be useful
in some circumstances. In addition, we hope that this paper can initiate a larger conversation about
the role of fairness in various forms in mechanism design.
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A Utility Prices and CEEI
The rest of the section assumes sj = 1 for all j, which is without loss of generality. The set of utility
prices that we are interested in are those such that they correspond to feasible allocations and prices
in the following sense
Definition 7. A vector β ∈ Rn++ of utility prices are budget feasible if there exists x, p such that
pj = maxi βivij for all j, xij > 0⇒ i ∈ arg maxi′ βi′vi′j , and p · xi ≤ Bi for all i.
We now show that taking the elementwise max over a pair of utility-price vectors preserves budget
feasibility. We then show that CEEI corresponds to the unique maximal point of the set of budget-
feasible utility prices.
Lemma 1 (Elementwise max preserves feasibility). Let β, β′ be budget-feasible utility prices. Then
their elementwise max β+ = max(β, β′) is also budget feasible.
Proof. Since β is budget feasible there exists x, p such that pj = maxi βivij for all j and p ·xi ≤ Bi
for all i. Similarly let x′, p′ be such a pair for β′. Now let p+ = maxi β+vij . We construct the
allocation x+ as follows: for all i let xˆi, pˆi be the allocation and price vectors corresponding to the
allocation of i under the max of βi, β′i, we set x
+
ij = xˆij for all j such that β
+
i vij = maxi′ β
+
i′ vi′j ,
and we set x+ij = 0 otherwise. Now for any j such that x
+
ij > 0 we have p
+
j = p
i
j , and for all j
we have x+ij ≤ xˆij since maxi′ β+i′ vi′j weakly increased relative to both β and β′. It follows that
p+ · x+i ≤ Bi.
Lemma 2 (CEEI corresponds to maximal β). The CEEI solution corresponds to the unique maximal
utility prices β such that β ≥ β′ for all β′ that are budget feasible.
Proof. First we note that
∑
j pj =
∑
iBi in CEEI. Thus, any non-maximal β cannot be a CEEI
solution, since there must then exist β′ ≥ β, β′ 6= β which is budget feasible. But then the prices p′
under β′ are still budget feasible and
∑
j p
′
j >
∑
j pj ; this shows that
∑
j pj <
∑
iBi for all non-
maximal β. Furthermore, a maximal β is guaranteed to exist, as we know that β ∈ (0,maxi
∑
i′ Bi′∑
j vij
)
and thus the set of possible choices for β is closed and bounded. Since the CEEI solution is guaranteed
to exist it must correspond to the unique maximal β.
B Proof that CEEI is SPL
Our proof relies on the maximality structure of utility prices shown in Lemma 2 .
Lemma 3. For any market, an individual can affect the price pj of any item j by at most Bisj .
Proof. Let i be an arbitrary individual. Now consider the CEEI solution (x, p) when i does not
participate in the market, and let β ∈ Rn be the associated per-individual utility prices, with βi = 0.
We know that (β, x, p) constitutes a budget-feasible solution to the market that includes i. Now, by
the monotonicity of utility prices we know that the CEEI for the market that includes i must have
utility prices β′ ≥ β. It follows from the utility-rate monotonicity that prices must go up, but we
also know that the new prices p′ must satisfy
∑
j sjp
′
j =
∑
i′ Bi, whereas
∑
j sjpj =
∑
i′ 6=iBi.
It follows that, at worst, individual i can increase the supply-weighted price sjp′j by at most Bi,
since otherwise
∑
j sjp
′
j >
∑
i′ Bi. It follows that no matter what value individual i reports,
p′j ∈
[
pj , pj +
Bi
sj
]
.
If we were not interested in obtaining a rate of convergence to SP-L, then Lemma 3 could be combined
with the results of Roberts and Postlewaite (1976); Jackson and Manelli (1997) to show SP-L. A
similar rate-less result follows from Roberts and Postlewaite (1976).
Lemma 4. For all j ∈ J and any set of individuals I ′ such that some i in I ′ has vij > 0, we have
pj ≥ |I
′|miniBi
n
∑
j′∈J cj′v
′′
j
v′j =: p
↓
j ,
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where v′j ≤ mini∈I′ vij and v′′j′ ≥ maxi∈I′ vij′ for all j′ ∈ J .
Proof. We have
∑
i∈I′ ui ≤
∑
j′∈J fj′(n)v
′′
j′ , which implies∑
i∈I′
Bi
βi
=
∑
i∈I′
ui ≤
∑
j′∈J
fj′(n)v
′′
j′ ⇒
∑
i∈I′
1
βi
≤
∑
j′∈J fj′(n)v
′′
j′
miniBi
≤
∑
j′∈J cj′nv
′′
j′
miniBi
where cj′ is an upper bound on the growth rate of the supply of item j′. For the above inequality to
hold there must exist some i∗ such that
1
βi∗
≤ n
∑
j′∈J cj′v
′′
j′
|I|miniBi
which implies
βi∗ ≥ |I|miniBi
n
∑
j′∈J cj′v
′′
j′
Now using the dual constraint pj ≥ βi∗vi∗j we get
pj ≥ |I|miniBi
n
∑
j′∈J cj′v
′′
j′
v′j′
We now can complete the proof that any deviation gains in CEEI are of O( 1n ).
Proof. Consider some arbitrary individual i with valuation vector vi. First we bound the gain from
some specific item j. Pick some v′j > 0, v
′′
j and let I ′j be the set of individuals in a given market such
that v′j ≤ vi′j ≤ v′′j for all i′ ∈ I ′j . Let the probability of sampling an individual belonging to I ′j be
θj . Such a set is guaranteed to exist since f has full support, and all valuations belong to some set
with positive measure. When sampling a market of size n, the expected size of I ′j is E(|I ′j |) = nθj .
Now we can use Hoeffding’s inequality to get that |I ′j | has size less than 12nθj with probability at
most 2e−
1
2nθ
2
j . Finally, if I ′j has size at least 12nθj then by Lemmas 3 and 4 the possible improvement
to bang-per-buck by lowering the price to pj can be bounded as (for sufficiently large n such that sj
is large enough to guarantee not dividing by zero)
Bivij
pj
≤ Bivij
p′j − Bisj
=
Bivij
p′j(1− Bisjp′j )
=
Bivij
p′j
1
(1− Bisjp′j )
=
Bivij
p′j
sjp
′
j
sjp′j −Bi
≤ Bivij
p′j
sjp
↓
j
sjp
↓
j −Bi
(1)
Now consider I ′j for each j. The probability that at least one j is such that I ′j does not have at least
1
2nθj individuals with such a valuation can be upper bounded by the union bound
∑
j∈J 2e
− 12nθ2j ≤
2me−
1
2nminj θ
2
j . We now bound the expected utility gain by bounding each of the two cases: there
exists a j such that I ′j does not have at least 12nθj individuals with such a valuation, or there does not
exist such a j.
First the case where such a j exists. Since the likelihood of such a j existing is exponentially
decreasing, it will be sufficient to loosely bound the utility in this case by s · vi, the utility to i of
getting all the items. Thus the contribution to the expected gain from this case is
2me−
1
2nminj θ
2
j s · vi (2)
When there is no such j, we know from Lemma 4 that each price is lower bounded by pj ≥
θj mini Bi
2
∑
j′ cj′v
′′
j′
. Thus the maximum utility that i can gain in this case can be upper bounded by u↑i :=
maxj
Bivij2
∑
j′ cj′v
′′
j′
θj mini′ Bi′
, which is independent of the instance size n. Now the utility gain for any
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particular market where no such j exists can be bounded as
(max
j
Bivij
pj
−max
j′
Bivij′
pj′
) ≤ (max
j
Bivij
p′j
sjp
↓
j
sjp
↓
j −Bi
−max
j′
Bivij′
pj′
) ≤ u↑i (max
j
sjp
↓
j
sjp
↓
j −Bi
− 1)
(3)
Combining (2) and (3) the total expected gain can be bounded as
(1− 2me− 12nminj θ2j )u↑i (max
j
sjp
↓
j
sjp
↓
j −Bi
− 1) + 2me− 12nminj θ2j s · vi ≤ O(u↑i (max
j
sjp
↓
j
sjp
↓
j −Bi
− 1))
≤ O( 1
n
)
B.1 Proof that EqEEI Has No Disparate Impact in Allocations
Proof. Consider the distributions f0x , f
1
x . For any allocation vector xi ∈ Xi, let Vˆxi be the set of
valuation vectors such that agents with a valuation vector in Vˆxi is assigned xi. Note that for a specific
valuation, only one allocation is possible, since we pool the items among all individuals with the
same valuation vector and redivide their items uniformly among the individuals with that valuation
vector. Now we use the fact that fˆ1
Vˆ
(vi) = fˆ
0
Vˆ
(vi) for all vi to get
f0x(xi) =
∑
vi∈Vˆxi
fˆ0
Vˆ
(vi) =
∑
vi∈Vˆxi
fˆ1
Vˆ
(vi) = f
1
x(xi).
B.2 Proof that CEEqI is SP-L
Proof. Let i be some individual in group 1, and let δ > 0. Let x, p be the allocation and prices when
i reports truthfully, and let x′, p′ be the allocation and prices when i reports some scaled value αvi
for α ∈ [0, 1). Let B1, B′1 be the corresponding budgets for group 1. We know that U(x)1 = U(x)0,
and thus when i reports a valuation scaled to near zero, the CEEqI solution must increase the average
utility of group 1 by ui(x). We show that a constant fraction of the n1 other individuals in group 1
capture a linear amount of utility for any increase in utility to i, and thus as the market gets large the
increase in utility for i cannot be large since these other individuals quickly gain the requisite ui(x)
utility that achieves the CEEqI condition.
Let Iδ be the set of individuals such that |vij − vi′j | ≤ δ for all i′ ∈ Iδ. For any i′ ∈ Iδ we can
lower bound the increase in utility that i′ gets based on the utility ∆ui = ui(x′)− ui(x) that i gains
by misreporting. Let j, j′ be the best bang-per-buck items for i under p and p′ respectively.
B1vi′j
pj
≤ B1vij
pj
+
B1
pj
δ ≤ B1vij′
p′j
+
B1
pj
δ −∆ui ≤ B1vi
′j′
p′j
+ δ(
B1
pj
+
B1
pj′
)−∆ui
Thus i′ gains at least ∆ui − δ(B1pj + B1pj′ ).
Now let θδ be the probability of sampling an individual i′ such that i′ ∈ Iδ . The expected size of Iδ
is nθδ. Now the probability of having less than 12nθδ individuals in Iδ is less than 2e−
1
2 θδn. Thus
the total utility gain in Iδ is at least(
1
2
nθδ
)(
∆ui − δ
(
B1
pj
+
B1
pj′
))
(4)
Now we can pick δ sufficiently small such that the second parenthesis above is strictly positive (such
a δ is guaranteed to exist since we can lower-bound prices via Lemma 4, where the choice of I in
Lemma 4 can be chosen independently of δ). Now by misreporting their valuation as αvi causes an
increase in B1 such that the total utility of group 1 increases by ui(x). But by (4) i’s share of this
increase is decreasing in n.
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The above shows that the utility gain from reporting a scaled-down valuation tends to zero as the
market gets large. Since the theorem above shows that the utility gain from reporting a different
utility vector v′i combined with some scalar α tends to zero, as compared to reporting αvi. Thus the
expected utility from misreporting tends to 0 as the market gets large.
The argument for individuals in group 0 is completely analogous.
B.3 MovieLens 1M Training
We construct our market as follows. We train a model to minimize the loss
min
α,β,U,M
∑
dataset
(rij − αi + βj + ui ·mj)2
where ui is a user specific d dimensional vector, mj is a movie specific d dimensional vector and αi,
βj are user/movie specific biases (i.e. average ratings).
We train a recommender system model on the data using standard techniques in PyTorch using
a validation set to choose hyperparameters d and regularization parameter. Our best performing
model has an out-of-sample MSE of ∼ .86 (comparable to other matrix-based collaborative filtering
techniques Sedhain et al. (2015)), dimension d = 10 and weight decay (l2 regularization) parameter of
1e− 5. To enforce the positivity constraint we project the vectors such that each predicted rˆij > .01.
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